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The New International Law of Sales: A Marriage
Between Socialist, Third World, Common, and
Civil Law Principles
Sara G. Zwart *
I. U.S. Ratification of the International Sales Law
If an American sells widgets to an Italian, which law governs the
sale-U.S., Italian, or some other law? Soon the answer to this ques-
tion could be the new international law of sales. On October 9,
1986,' the U.S. Senate ratified the 1980 United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the Convention).2
Along with China and Italy, the United States deposited its ratifica-
tion with the Secretary-General of the United Nations (U.N.) 3 on De-
cember 11, 1987, becoming the ninth, tenth, and eleventh country to
sanction the Convention. 4 On January 1, 1988, 5 twelve full months
Assistant Professor, New York University; Master of Laws 1961, Free University of
Amsterdam; J.D. 1972, University of Utah; LL.M. 1983, New York University.
I Senate Approves Vienna Convention on Sale of Goods, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1293
(Oct. 22, 1986). Vote was 98 to 0. Id.
2 The Convention was unanimously approved by a diplomatic conference of sixty-
two states in Vienna on April 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668
(1980). Text appears in several publications, e.g., J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION, app. A (1982).
3 Art. 89. ("The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the
depository for this Convention.").
4 States which have ratified the Convention include Argentina (July 19, 1983), China
(Dec. 11, 1986), Egypt (Dec. 6, 1982), France (Aug. 6, 1982), Hungary (June 16, 1983),
Italy (Dec. 11, 1986), Lesotho (June 18, 1981), Syrian Arab Republic (Oct. 19, 1982), Yu-
goslavia (March 27, 1985), and Zambia (June 2, 1986). States which signed or acceded (i.e.
signed after expiration of the official sign-up period), but not ratified inclhde: Austria
(April 1i, 1980), Chile (Sept. 30, 1981), Czechoslovakia (Sept. 1, 1981), Denmark (May 26,
1981), Finland (May 26, 1981), German Democratic Republic (Aug. 13, 1981), Federal
Republic of Germany (May 26, 1981), Ghana (April 11, 1980), The Netherlands (May 29,
1981), Norway (May 26, 1981), Poland (Sept. 28, 1981), Singapore (April 11. 1980), Swe-
den (May 26, 1981), United States (Dec. 11, 1986), Venezuela (Sept. 28, 1981). Countries
expected to adopt the Convention in the near future: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czecho-
slovakia, India, England, Mexico, The Netherlands, and Switzerland. In five years 30 to 40
states are expected to join. Information available from: Mr. Max Levy, Treaty Section of
Legal Affairs, Room S-3200, United Nations, New York, New York 10017. Tel. (212) 963-
1234.
5 Art. 99(1). "This Convention enters into force on the first day of the month fol-
lowing the expiration of twelve months after the date of deposit of the tenth instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession." Id.
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after adoption by ten countries, the Convention becomes effective.
Treaty law will thus impact sales law, an area normally left to coun-
tries or states. 6
II. Purpose and Scope
What are the advantages of an international law on sales? Could
the parties simply apply domestic law to their transactions? As no
one cares to surrender to foreign legal systems, international traders
must sometimes defer to foreign law. The Convention seeks to pro-
tect against the vagaries of such foreign law which must be identified,
understood, and proven in court. By unifying and codifying an inter-
national law of sales, the Convention gives international traders a
ready-made fall back position when disagreeing on the applicable
law.
After setting forth the scope of its application, 7 the Convention
contains detailed rules on the formation of contracts8 and the obliga-
tions of sellers 9 and buyers.10 It further contains specific provisions
on fundamental breach,II avoidance,12 error in communications, 13
specific performance,' 4 writing requirements,' 5 and passing of
risk.' 6 Final provisions deal with ministerial matters and reserva-
tions. 17 In toto, the Convention consists of 4 Parts and 101 Arti-
cles, 18 all geared to be of practical help'to sellers and buyers in
different countries by reducing legal pitfalls.' 9
6 Sales law in the United States is typically within the domain of the state. An over-
riding treaty is highly unusual. It is the first time the treaty power has been used to enact
private as opposed to public law. See International Sale of Goods: Hearings on Treaty Doc. 98-9,
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1984), (statement of
Frank A. Orban III, International Counsel, Armstrong World Industries, Inc.) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings].
7 Arts. 1-13.
8 Arts. 14-24.
9 Arts. 30-52.
10 Arts. 53-65. Arts. 71-84 contain provisions common for seller and buyer.
I I Art. 25.
12 Art. 26.
13 Art. 27.
14 Art. 28.
15 Art. 29.
t( Arts. 66-70.
17 Arts. 89-101.
18 Part I. Sphere of Application and General Provisions (arts. 1-13); Part II. Forma-
tion of Contract (arts. 14-24); Part III. Sale of Goods (arts. 25-88); Part IV. Final Provi-
sions (arts. 89-101).
11) Much has already been written on the Convention. The standard work is by ..
HONNOLO, supra note I (Prof. Honnold is preparing a new treatise on the Convention).
See also Coimmentarv on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Pre-
pared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (Mar. 14, 1979). For a list of publications
up to Oct. 1, 1983, see Winship, Bibliography: International Sales of Goods, 18 INT'l. LW. 53
(1984).
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III. Basic Principles
The leading course through the drafting years was to create an
acceptable, workable law, stressing the Convention's international
character. Rather than supplanting domestic law, the Convention
implements it in the international arena, and then, only if the coun-
tries of both parties have ratified. The Convention thus applies only
to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of busi-
ness are in different countries, both of which have adopted the Con-
vention.20 Such countries share a common interest in international
trade as manifested by formal ratification of the Convention.
To encourage large-scale adoption, the Convention does not en-
compass subjects considered too controversial for agreement. Lia-
bility for defective products, for example, varies in different
countries. Some have a developed system of product liability law,
others do not. The Convention thus limits itself to commercial
transactions. It does not apply to consumer sales 2 1 or affect liability
for death or personal injuries. 22 Questions regarding the validity of
a contract, such as fraud, illegality, duress, and unconscionability are
also left to domestic law. 23  Excluded further are third party
problems, a subject which was believed too controversial for resolu-
tion under this Convention. 24
In dealing with interpretation, the Convention seeks to prevent
any one domestic law from becoming dominant, since this would dis-
courage worldwide adoption. Interpretation must respond to the in-
ternational character, promote uniformity, take account of custom
and usages, and observe good faith. 25 If the meaning is still unclear,
20 Art. l(l)(a). In the event of more places of business, the one with the "closest
relationship" to the contract applies (art. 10(a)); and when no place is identified the "ha-
bitual residence" applies (art. 10(b)). According to art. l(l)(b) the Convention applies
also "when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a
Contracting State." Art. 95 permits states to declare this article inapplicable. Because of
the uncertainty surrounding private international law and the likelihood that foreign law
would frequently replace domestic law, the United States ratified subject to the art. 95
reservation, thus excluding art. l(1)(b). See Appendix B of the Legal Analysis, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SALE OF GOODS (N. Galston & H. Smit ed. 1984) app. 1-27 [hereinafter INTERNA-
TIONAL SALES].
21 Art. 2. "The Convention does not apply to sales (a) of goods bought for personal.
family or household use, unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the
contract, neither knew or ought to have known that the goods were bought for any such
use." Id.
22 Art. 5. "This Convention does not apply to the liability of the seller for death or
personal injury caused by the goods to any person." Id.
23 Art. 4. "This Convention ... is not concerned with: (a) the validity of the contract
. (b) the effect which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold." Id.
24 Honnold, The New Uniform Law for International Sales and the UCC: .1 Comparison, 18
INT'L LAW. 21, 24 (1984).
25 Art. 7(1). "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its inter-
national character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the obser-
vance of good faith in international trade." Id.
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recourse must be made to the general principles of the Convention
or to "the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private interna-
tional law." 26 The Convention also emphasizes custom and usage in
the interpretation as well as elsewhere.2 7 This feature ensures flexi-
bility and further growth of the law and promotes worldwide
acceptance. 28
The Convention also seeks to save the contract from technical
and trivial attacks. International transportation costs complicate
,remedies (nonacceptance and revocation) for nonconforming goods.
Avoidance of the contract, therefore, is allowed only in "fundamen-
tal" breaches. 29 The Convention also gives the breaching party
broad powers to cure.30
To prevent problems of translation and interpretation the Con-
vention's language is terse and clear, and its concepts are uncompli-
cated. The obligations of the buyer and seller mirror one another.
They are built on the expectations of the parties and applicable trade
customs. Further, the remedies for failure to perform do not depend
on how the breach is classified or its seriousness. The Convention
rejects a more cumbersome approach of separate remedies for differ-
ent, types of breach.31
Most importantly, parties may opt out of the Convention or vary
the effect of any of its provisions. Founded on the principle of free-
dom of contract law, the right to opt out was considered essential for
acceptance, effectiveness, and growth of the Convention. 32
26 Art. 7(2). "Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are
not expressly settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in
the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules
of private international law." Id. For a discussion of Art. 7, See E6rsi, General Provisions in
INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 20, §§ 2.03-04.
27 See art. 9 (binding the parties to any usage to which they have agreed and, unless
otherwise agreed, to any usage which "they have impliedly made applicable to their con-
tract or its formation .. .of which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in
international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of
the type involved in the particular trade concerned").
28 See Note, Trade Usages in International Sales of Goods: An Aialvsis ofthe 1964 and 1980
Sales Conventitos, 24 VA.J. INT'L L. 619, 665 (1984) (concluding that "If the Convention as
a whole reflects overall efficiency of trade usage provisions, ratification would assist
merchants in maximizing their return from international transactions").
29 Art. 25 calls a breach fundamental "if it results in such detriment to the other part%
as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless
the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same
circumstances would not have foreseen such a result." This is opposed to U.C.C. § 2-601
(1978) which obligates the seller to make "perfect tender". Bit see also U.C.C. § 2-608
(limiting a buyer's right to revoke accepted nonconforming goods only upon a showing of
"substantial" impairment). For a discussion see Clausson, Avoidmce in A1'onqynie, Sita-
lions and Fndaoiental Breach Under the 1980 U.A'. Convention on Contracts for the Sale of Goods, 6
N.Y.L.S.J. IN'i. & COMt'. L. 93 (1984).
" See arts. 34, 37, and 48. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-508 (also liberally allowing cure).
: See J. HONNOLI), stpra note I, at 26.
"12 Art. 6. "The parties may exclude the application of the Convention or... derogate
from or vary the effect of any of its provisions." Id. Unlike the U.C.C. which disallows
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IV. The Convention's Genesis and Driving Force: UNCITRAL
The Convention is a milestone for the U.N. Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which was established by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1966 to unify and harmonize
international trade law.3 3 UNCITRAL's first undertaking was the
drafting of an international law of sales. 34 Work on such a law had
already begun in 1930 by the International Institute for the Unifica-
tion of Private Law (UNIDROIT). UNIDROIT is a committee of
largely well-known European commercial lawyers established by the
League of Nations in Rome in 1923.35 Their work formed the basis
for the Conventions on Uniform Rules on Formation (ULF) 36 and on
the Obligations of International Sales Contracts (ULIS). 37 Both
Conventions were finalized by the Hague Convention on Interna-
tional Law in 1964.38 Although these Conventions went into effect
in 1972 by the minimal ratification of five states, they were never truly
accepted.39 Draftsmen were predominantly West-European (the
United States joined at the last minute) and outsiders saw no reason
to adopt a Convention in which they had no hand in establishing.40
Due to its worldwide support as a U.N. body, UNCITRAL
opened the road to broad participation. It has thirty-six rotating
members allocated among the regions of the world. For example,
Africa sends nine representatives, Asia seven, Eastern Europe five,
unlimited disclaimer of warranties (U.C.C. § § 2-316, 2-719) or "unconscionable" contract
clauses (U.C.C. § 2-302), freedom of contract under the Convention is without
exemptions.
'1 G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), 272 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 99, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
34 In addition to the 1980 Convention on the International Sale of Goods, UNCI-
TRAL's work includes: The New York 1974 Convention on the Limitation Period in the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, amended in 1980 to align it with the 1980 Sales Convention (U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 63/15 1974); 1978 Convention on the Caiage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg Rules) (U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 89/13, Annex 1); 1976 UTCITRAL Arbitration Rules 31 U.N. GAOR Supp.
No. 17 U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976); 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Coninercial
Arbitration, G.A. Res. 40/72, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985).
See Fleischhauer, UAVCITRAL 11odel Law on International Conimercial Arbitration, 41 TIHE ARB.
J. 17 (1986). Work in process deals with negotiable instruments, electronic fund transfers,
construction of large industrial works, and countertrade. Id.
35 See, e.g., Farnsworth, The Vienna Convention: Histoiy and Scope, 18 INT'L LAw. 17
(1984).
36 834 U.N.T.S. 169, 185, reprinted in 3 INT'L LEGAL MArERIALS 864 (1964).
37 834 U.N.T.S. 109, 123, repiinted iii 3 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 855 (1964).
38 Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, July 15, 1955, 15 U.
S. T. 2228, T. I. A. S. No. 5710, 220 U.N.T.S. 123. The first Hague Conference convened
in 1893. See generally, Droz & Dyer, The Hague Conference and the Main Issues of Private Interna-
tional Law for the Eighties, 3 Nw.J. INT't, L. & Bus. 155. 157 n.6 (1981).
'1'0 Of the few adhering states, the UK conditioned ratification upon actual election of
the Convention by the contract parties, an event still to occur. See Farnsworth, Dev'eloping
International Trade Law, 9 CAL. W. INT'L. 1L. J. 461, 463 (1986).
40 Professors John Honnold and Soia Mentschikolf represented the United States
during the final months of negotiation, which was too late to accomplish major changes.
See landau, Background to U.S. Participation in United ANations Convention on Contracts foi the
Intlernational Sale of Goods, 18 INT'L. LAw. 29, 30 (1984).
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Latin America six, and Western Europe, Australia, Canada and the
United States are jointly permitted nine.4 ' The full commission
meets once a year for sessions of two to four weeks in New York or
Vienna. Working groups, reflecting cross sections of the commis-
sion's worldwide representation, study the subjects for the meetings
in advance. Its Secretariat is a full-time body composed of an inter-
national team of professionals (mostly lawyers) with offices in U.N.
City in Vienna. The Secretariat chairs and prepares the annual meet-
ings in close cooperation with the full commission and working
groups, as well as with other interested parties. 42
V. The East Bloc Perspective
East Bloc countries have been generally supportive of UNCI-
TRAL's work. Hungary had been instrumental in creating UNCI-
TRAL, and together with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (among others)
participated in drafting the Sales Convention.4 3 The main function
of contracts in socialist countries is to help the state fulfill its national
plans. Contract law in socialist countries is therefore characterized
by general principles. Contracting parties are under state direction.
They work, ultimately, not for their own gain, but for and on behalf
of the state. Employees violating this "contractual discipline" are
subject to fines and punishment. 44  An overriding consideration is
the principle of "socialist cooperation." Parties in socialist countries
deal not at arm's length, but owe each other a duty to obtain mutu-
ally satisfactory results. 4 5 Achievement of these principles is helped
by standardization of contract terms, which is exactly what the Con-
vention offers. 4 6
Standardization of contract terms within the Soviet bloc had al-
41 See, e.g., Honnold, Uncitral' First Decade-The Draft Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods: An Overview, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 223 (1979). .
42 The Secretariat enjoys an excellent reputation, for which the groundwork was laid
by John Honnold, the Secretariat's first chairman from 1969-1975. See Theberge Prize for
Private International Law Recipient:John 0. Honnold, 20 INT'L LAW. 633 (1986). See also several
dedications to Professor Honnold by his alma mater, the University of Pennsylvania:
Bruton, Dedication:John Honnold: A Personal Tribute, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 935 (1984); Reitz,
Dedication:John Honnold as Teacher, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 939 (1984); Pfund, Dedication:John 0.
Honnold, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 941 (1984); Graf, Dedication: John 0. Honnold and the Vienna
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 943 (1984); Sono, Dedication,
John 0. Honnold, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 947 (1984).
43 See Honnold, supra note 4 1, at 225 n. 12. See also article by the Hungarian represen-
tative E6rsi, Unifying the Law (A PlaY in One Act With a Song), 25 AM.J. COMP. L. 658 (1977).
44 See generally Note, Unraveling an Enigma: An Introduction to Soviet Law and the Soviet
Legal System, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 18 (1985).
45 See E6rsi, Contract in the Socialist Economy, in Vii INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 3, 30 (1978).
46 See also Enderlein, Problems of the Lnification of Sales Law from the Standpoint of the So-
cialist Countries, in 7 DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWs 26 (March 1980). Socialist countries
differentiate sales not by kind of goods, value, quality, or price but by parties, namely,
(1) citizens, (2) enterprises, (3) intersocialist, or (4) intersystemary (between socialist and
capitalist parties).
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ready been established by the Comecon countries 47 in 1958.48 Basi-
cally, the Comecon rules apply to all contracts of sale between
Comecon members without exception. Like the Convention, the
Comecon General Rules cover formation of contract, obligations of
sellers and buyers, breach, remedies, and force majeure. But unlike
the Convention, the Comecon Rules are longer, more detailed, for-
malistic, and mechanical. Also, as befitting the Socialist system, par-
ties may not deviate from the rules, since this would jeopardize
uniformity. And to ensure performance of the contract and thus ful-
fillment of the national plans, buyers are rarely permitted to reject
goods. Further, instead of the time-consuming system of proving
damages, the Rules provide for fixed penalties. 49 Despite differ-
ences, the Convention offers advantages similar to those of the
Comecon Rules. It protects parties against unknown foreign laws,
reduces the time of negotiation, and aids the parties in seeking ami-
cable, fair resolutions of their disptites. Understandably, Comecon
expressed general support for the Convention in March of 1983.50
Thus, with time, most East bloc countries may be expected to ratify
the Convention.
VI. The Third World Perspective
Developing countries will also benefit from a uniform sales law.
In one swipe it changes old, colonially inspired rules (which develop-
ing countries generally abhor) while serving as a buffer against un-
wanted foreign law. It provides these countries with a ready-made
legal framework for contracts, which otherwise would take too long
to develop. 51 A uniform law will also benefit individual business-
men. The Convention takes on the role of a lawyer, who otherwise
may not be available. Thus, since the Convention originated with
the U.N., a body generally perceived as promoting third world inter-
47 Comecon, in full the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, was formed in 1949
as the east bloc counterpart to the West-European countries which became united by the
Marshall Plan. Its members consist of the Soviet Union and its satellite states (Albania has
not participated since 1961), as well as Mongolia (admitted 1962), Cuba (admitted 1972),
and Vietnam (admitted 1978). The role of the latter three states is minor. Other commu-
nistic countries, such as Yugoslavia (which separated from the Soviets in 1948), China.
North Korea, Cambodia, and Laos are not members. See T. Ho'A, EAST-WEST TRADE,
COMECON LAW, AMERICAN-SOVIET TRADE 4 (1984).
48 The Comecon General Conditions were adopted in 1958, amended in 1964, re-
vised and enlarged in 1968, 1975, and 1979. See id. at 97.
4, See id. at 98.
50 See VieNna Comiention for Sale of Goods Gets Strong Backing, 19 Int'l Trade Rep.. U.S.
Export Weekly (BNA) No. 17, at 728, 29 (Aug. 16, 1983).
51 See Graf, spra note 4 1, at 945. "Like its counterpart in other Latin American coun-
tries, the Mexican Commercial Code is old and inadequate. It was originally copied from
texts elaborated in the nineteenth century that were not drafted or conceived for interna-
tional transactions."
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ests, developing countries have responded positively. 52
VII. Sensitive Issues
Despite a general consensus on the Convention's goals, coun-
tries disagreed on specific issues. East, West, North, and South each
had their own hobbyhorses, of which they could not or would not let
go.5 3
A. Sensitive Issues with East Bloc Countries
East and West confronted each other on four points: (1) the
need for a writing; (2) the use of usages; (3) the continuation of the
mirror-image rule; and (4) the utility of open price terms. 54
For state-operated societies, certainty, foreseeability, and lack of
surprises are deemed essential. Therefore, written proof of con-
tracts is of the essence in socialist countries. 55 Nevertheless, article
11 of the Convention states that a contract of sale need not be in
writing and may be proved by any means, including witnesses. 56
Most countries felt that writing requirements interfered with neces-
sary speed. 57 Of course, an offeror may insist on a written accept-
ance,58 or parties may agree to modify their contract only in
writing.59 With either side unable to agree on the basic issue, the
Convention compromised. Article 96 allows states which require
sales contracts to be in writing to declare article 11 inapplicable
where any party has his place of business in that state. 60 Here, prin-
ciples of conflict of laws determine whether a writing is necessary.
For example, if conflicts principles point to the law of the declaring
state a writing may be necessary, but if they point to the law of a
nonwriting state the law of the latter state will apply. Thus the law of
the declaring state does not automatically supersede the law of the
52 See generally, Date-Bah, Problems of the Unification of International Sales Law fiom the
Standpoint of Developing Countries, in 7 DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS 39 (March 1980).
53 See Farnsworth, supra note 39 (describing North-South and East-West confronta-
tions during the Convention's negotiations).
54 See E6rsi, A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 31 AM.J. COMP. L. 333, 341 (1983).
55 See also the Comecon Rules, which provide likewise that the offer and acceptance
"shall be valid on condition that they are executed in written form." Within Comecon,
however, there has been pressure to allow the contract to be proven by conduct. See T.
HOYA, supra note 47, at 182.
56 Art. 11.
57 In civil and common law countries oral contracts made strides over the past cen-
tury. Generally, commercial codes of civil law countries recognize oral contracts. England
repealed the 1677 Statute of Frauds for commercial contracts in 1954. U.C.C. § 2-201
gives effect to oral contracts under certain circumstances. See Honnold, The Uniform Law
for International Sales and the ('CC: A Comparison, 18 INT'L LAW. 21, 26 (1984).
58 See arts. 18 and 19.
' Art. 29.
6( Art. 96, called the "statute of frauds" reservation. Hungary has ratified subject to
art. 96.
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nondeclaring state.6'
Generally, East bloc countries do not give effect to trade usages,
unless the parties explicitly agreed to them and they do not violate
statutory provisions. In the Western world, flexibility of contract
outweighs certainty and rigidity. Here, custom and usages are dealt
a broader role. Under certain circumstances, trade usages may dero-
gate from statutory law and may apply even where the contract is
silent. 62
In bridging the gap between East and West perspectives, the
Convention binds the parties to any usage to which they have
agreed 63 and to those usages which the parties knew or ought to
have known were widely accepted in the industry. 64 Usages thus
continue to play a role in international contract law. 65
Most countries (East, West, North, or South) follow the mirror-
image rule which holds that the acceptance must be the exact replica
of the offer. An acceptance with different or additional terms is con-
sidered a rejection and counter offer. The United States forms the
exception. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), an accept-
ance that states "terms additional to or different from those offered"
operates as an acceptance, "unless acceptance is expressly made con-
ditional on assent to the additional or different terms."'66 With the
overwhelming majority of countries in favor of the mirror-image
rule, the Convention's choice was simple. Article 19(1) states that a
reply to an offer which contains additions or modifications operates
as a rejection and counter offer. 67 Article 19(2) provides a limited
exemption. As long as the additional or different terms do not "ma-
terially" alter the terms of the offer, offeree's reply constitutes an
acceptance, "unless the offeror, without undue delay, objects orally
to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect." '68 Terms re-
lating to price, payment, quality, place and time of delivery, extent of
one party's liability, and settlement of disputes, however, are all
deemed material. 69
Finally, socialist countries objected to open price terms which
61 See art. 12, and discussion byJ. HONNOLD, supra note 1, at 129.
62 See U.C.C. §§ 1-205 and 2-208 giving effect not only to usage of trade, but also to
course of dealing (sequence of previous conduct between the parties) and course of per-
formance (where the sale involves repeated performance by the parties).
63 Art. 9(1).
64 Art. 9(2).
65 One writer observed that "one of the most important features of the Convention is
the legal effect it gives to commercial usages and practices." J. HONNOLD, supra note 1, at
112.
(;6 U.C.C. § 2-207.
67 Art. 19(2).
68 Art. 19(2).
69 Art. 19(3). It has been suggested that only minor variations, such as changing
designation of the vessel, or packaging of the goods are nonmaterial. See Farnsworth, For-
mation of Contract, in INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 20, § 3.04, at 3-16.
1988]
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could leave them in limbo, thus jeopardizing necessary certainty.
U.S. law, on the other hand, allows for a reasonable price if the price
is not settled. 70 With few countries recognizing such a reasonable
price, article 14 of the Convention (in the formation section), seems
to say that to be "sufficiently definite" an offer must expressly or
implicitly fix the price.71 If, however, a contract has been "validly
concluded" but does not in any way fix the price, that price applies
which is generally charged for similar goods at the time of entering
into the contract. 72 Although not clear from doubt, 73 some room
seems left for open price terms.
B. Sensitive Issues with Third World Countries74
A conflict with third world countries arose from the several no-
tice requirements, especially those concerning nonconforming
goods. 75 For example, most countries insist on strict notice of non-
conformity so the seller can verify the defect and, where possible,
cure. Thus, under article 39 a buyer loses the right to rely on non-
conformity of goods if he fails to give prompt (at the latest two years
70 U.C.C. § 2-305.
71 Art. 14:
A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one or more specific per-
sons constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indicates the intention
of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance. A proposal is sufficiently
definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes
provision for determining the quantity and the price.
Id.
72 Art. 55 (under obligations of the buyer):
Where a contract has been validly concluded but does not expressly or im-
plicitly fix or make provision for determining the price, the parties are con-
sidered, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, to have impliedly
made reference to the price generally charged at the time of the conclusion
of the contract for such goods sold under comparable circumstances in the
trade concerned.
Id.
73 For example, can a contract be "validly concluded" without the price fixed? Ac-
cording to Honnold (J. HONNOLD, supra note 1, at 326), art. 55 only has independent
meaning for countries which have not adopted the Formation Sections of the Convention.
But see Farnsworth, Formation of Contract in INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 20, § 3.04 at 3-
9; Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 45 ORIO ST. L. J. 265, 289 (1985) [hereinafter Rosett I] ("The language of
this article [55] appears directly keyed to Art. 14(1) and seems to undercut the earlier
provision"); Tallon, The Buyer's Obligations under the Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, in INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 20, § 7.03, at 7.9-.17.
74 The North-South dialogue was characterized "first, by the economic fact that the
developing countries mainly export raw materials and agricultural products, i.e. mass
products, and import technology and finished goods; second, by the awareness of their
market's underdeveloped technological and legal condition; and third, by their frequently
justified mistrust of developed industrial states." See E6rsi, supra note 54, at 350.
75 Other conflicts with third world countries included the application of trade usages
(of which many developed during colonial times) and open price terms. The Convention's
solutions to these issues have been discussed at supra notes 62-65, 70-73 and accompany-
ing text.
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from receiving the goods) and specific notice to the seller. 76 Devel-
oping countries (frequent buyers of heavy machinery needed in de-
velopment), however, feared that defects may not show up until long
after delivery or that business people would fail to appreciate the
disastrous results of late or no notice. 77 To appease these countries
the Convention adopted several exemptions to the strict notice rule.
A seller may not rely on the lack of notice if the defect relates to facts
which he knows or could have known about and which he did not
disclose to the buyer. 78 Of greater importance, a buyer may deduct
the value of the defect from the price if he has a reasonable excuse
for not giving prompt notice. 79 Again, the Convention found a solu-
tion opposing parties were willing to accept.
Notice must also be given by a party who wants to suspend or
avoid the contract. For instance, article 71 permits a party to suspend
performance if it appears that the other might not perform (for ex-
ample, due to an impending insolvency or based upon performance
to date). 80 Further, under article 72 a party may avoid the contract
completely if prior to the date of performance (anticipatory breach)
it appears that the other party will commit a fundamental breach.8'
These required notices enable the other party to provide adequate
assurance of performance and thus could not be eliminated. Never-
theless, developing countries were fearful of abuse of the power to
suspend or avoid and the difficulty their businessmen might have
reading, writing, or answering notices. Following a study by an ad
hoc working group, certain compromises were reached. The notice
of avoidance must only be given if time allows, and is not required if
the other party has declared its intention not to perform its obliga-
tions. 82 Moreover, the anticipatory breach must be objectively
76 Art. 39.
77 See Date-Bah, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 1980: Overview and Selective Commentary, II REv. GHANAIAN L. 50 (1979). Ghana had
important but illiterate tradesmen, who sometimes needed foreign experts to test im-
ported complicated equipment. Also, it could take several years before delivered goods
reached their final destination. See id. at 66-67.
78 Art. 40.
79 Art. 44.
80 Art. 71.
A party may suspend the performance of his obligations if, after the conclu-
sion of the contract, it becomes apparent that the other party will not per-
form a substantial part of his obligations as a result of
a. a serious deficiency in his ability to perform or in his creditworthi-
ness; or
b. his conduct in preparing to perform or in performing the contract.
Id.
81 Art. 72(1). "If prior to the date for performance of the contract it is clear that one
of the parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract, the other party may declare
the contract avoided." Id.
82 Art. 72:
(2) If time allows, the party intending to declare the contract avoided must
1988]
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"clear."183 In case of suspension the suspending party must continue
performance if the other party provides adequate assurances. Obvi-
ously, under such circumstances parties must stay in contact and no-
tify the other of exactly what is happening. However, to appease
developing countries, the Convention elevated the standard for in-
voking the suspension right. Originally a suspending party needed
only "good grounds to conclude" that the other would not per-
form.84 Under final article 71, the nonperformance "must become
apparent." 8 5 Thus, suspension cannot be made on mere hunches,
but requires a high degree of probability of nonperformance.8 6
C. Sensitive Issues Between Civil and Common Law Countries
Civil and common law countries met head on in the field of rem-
edies, particularly in the area of specific performance.8 7 In common
law countries the prevailing remedy is damages, and specific per-
formance is only granted if the damages are inadequate, such as
where the subject matter is unique or irreplaceable. 88  Civil law
countries permit specific performance more generally. 8 9 Thus, in
line with civil law thinking, the Convention allows the parties to re-
quire each other to perform. 90 In putting limits on specific perform-
ance, the buyer may require substitute performance only if the defect
amounts to a fundamental breach. 9' Common law countries were
still not satisfied. By way of compromise, article 28 states that a
court need not order specific performance, "unless the court would
do so under its own law in respect to similar contracts of sale not
governed by the Convention."' 9 2 U.S. courts faced with a remedy is-
sue under the Convention, therefore need only grant specific per-
formance in "unique" situations. 9 3
Another civil law remedy raising eyebrows with common law
give reasonable notice to the other party in order to permit him to provide
adequate assurance of his performance.
(3) The requirements of the preceding paragraph do not apply if the other
party has declared that he will not perform his obligations.
Id.
83 See art. 72(l).
84 See J. HONNOLD, supra note 1, at 385-98.
85 Art. 71(1).
86 See J. HONNOLD, supra note i, at 389.
87 See generally, Gonzalez, Remedies under the U.N. Convention for the International Sale of
Goods, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 79 (1984); Stern, A Practitioners Guide to the Un'ited Nations
Convention for the International Sale of Goods, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L & POL. 81 (1983).
88 See U.C.C. §§ 2-711(2) (on damages), 2-716 (buyer's right to specific
performance).
8" See Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief, 27 AM. J. ComP. L. 247 (1979).
90 Art. 46(l). "The buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations
unless .... I Id.; Art. 62. "The seller may require the buyer to pay the price, take delivery
or perform his other obligations, unless .... Id.
' Art. 46(2). For the definition of "fundamental," see art. 25 cited supra note 29.
112 Art. 28.
93 SeeJ. HONNOLD, supra note 1, at 196.
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countries is article 50, which allows the buyer unilaterally to reduce
the price of nonconforming goods to the degree of deficiency. 9 4 ,
Here common law buyers are limited to damages. Under Roman
and civil law a seller was only liable for damages if he was guilty of
fault or fraud. Delivery of nonconforming goods was not considered
fault or fraud. On the other hand, it was thought unfair to have the
buyer pay full price for defective goods. To prevent unjust enrich-
ment, Roman law developed the action for the reduction of the price
(actio quanti minoris), which was adopted later by the civil law.9 5 Since
civil law countries refused to part with their heritage, common law
countries finally gave in. Not only was it thought that the remedy
would be rarely invoked, 96 it also did not apply if the seller was pre-
cluded from exercising his right to cure.9 7 Thus, one of the basic
principles of remedies, a buyer's duty to mitigate damages, was not
impaired by the Convention.
A civil law remedy finding its place in the Convention with less
opposition is the German Nachfrist notice. Under this rule a buyer
may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for the
seller to deliver. 9 8 The seller may extend the time for the buyer to
pay the price or take delivery. 9 9 If buyer or seller fails to comply
within this additional period, the other may withdraw from the con-
tract without regard to whether the breach is fundamental. °0 0 With-
94 Art. 50:
If the goods do not conform with the contract and whether or not the price
has already been paid, the buyer may reduce the price in the same propor-
tion as the value that the goods actually delivered had at the time of the
delivery bears to the value that conforming goods would have had at that
time.
Id.
95 SeeJ. HONNOLD, supra note 1, at 313.
96 See Bergsten & Miller, The Remedy of Reduction of Price, 27 AM.J. CoMp. L. 225, 272,
275 (1979).
97 Art. 50, (second sentence).
98 Art. 47:
(1) The buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for
performance by the seller of his obligations.
(2) Unless the buyer has received notice from the seller that he will not
perform within the period so fixed, the buyer may not, during that period,
resort to any remedy for breach of contract. However, the buyer is not de-
prived thereby of any right he may have to claim damages for delay in
performance.
Id.
'J' Art. 63:
(1) The seller may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for
performance by the buyer of his obligations.
(2) Unless the seller has received notice from the buyer that he will not
perform within the period so fixed, the seller may not, during that period,
resort to any remedy for breach of contract. However, the seller is not de-
prived thereby of any right he may have to claim damages for delay in
performance.
Id.
14) See Art. 49(l)(b) (for buyer); Art. 64(l)(b) (for seller).
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out such extra time a party may withdraw only for fundamental
breach. This "after call" notice clarifies the position of the parties at
an early stage and reduces difficulties in proving the seriousness of
the breach. Because of this practical implication, the Nachfrist notice
received general international approval. 10 '
A minor friction between civil and common law countries was
presented by the common law "mailbox" rule, which makes a written
acceptance effective upon dispatch. The risk of transportation thus
rests on the offeror. The mailbox rule dates back to the British case
of Adams v. Lindsell,10 2 in which the offeror misdirected the offer, thus
delaying the offeree's acceptance. After dispatch of the acceptance,
but before its receipt, the offeror had sold the goods to a third party.
Upon a claim for damages, the court ruled for the offeree because
the mishap occurred as a result of the offeror's neglect. It thereby
created the mailbox rule, which has been followed in England and
the U.S. ever since.
Civil law countries, on the other hand, adhered to the "receipt"
rule, which puts the risk of mailing on the offeree. By selecting the
medium, the offeree is considered in the best position to insure
against possible delays and hazards. Consequently, article 18(2) de-
clares an offer effective when it reaches the offeror.' 0 3 In accordance
with the dispatch rule, however, an offer may not be revoked if the
revocation reaches the offeree after he has dispatched an accept-
ance. t0 4 Thus, dispatch remains the standard to determine timeli-
ness of revocation of the offer.
The above discussion raises the concept of consideration, an-
other issue on which civil and common law countries differ. Under
common law an offer may be revoked until it is accepted, because the
offeree has not paid consideration. Even "firm" offers stating to be
irrevocable may still be revoked unless the offeree has paid pepper-
corn consideration. Civil law countries never adopted the concept of
consideration, thus holding offerors accountable to firm offers. In
balancing out civil and common law doctrines, the Convention first
leans to the common law, declaring offers revocable. 10 5 It then
carves out several restrictions. First, as said before, revocation is dis-
allowed after dispatch of acceptance. 10 6 Firm offers and offers on
which the offeree has acted in reliance are also irrevocable. 10 7 Fi-
101 SeeJ. HONNOLD, supra note 1, at 290-91 and 351-52.
102 1 Barn k Aid. 681 (K. B. 1818).
103 Art. 18(2). "An acceptance of an offer becomes effective at the moment the indica-
tion of assent reaches the offeror." Id.
104 Art. 16(l).
105 Art. 16(1). "Until acontract is concluded an offer may be revoked if the revocation
reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance." Id.
Io6 Id.
107 Art. 16(2). "However, an offer cannot be revoked: (a) if it indicates, whether by
stating a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise, that it is irrevocable; or (b) if it was rea-
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nally, parties may change their contract without further considera-
tion. 108  Although this provision seems to follow the civil law
approach, the actual practice in common law countries is not that
dissimilar. The UCC upholds firm offers and contract modifications
without consideration.' 0 9 Further, the doctrine of detrimental reli-
ance has been recognized in the United States as a substitute for
consideration.' 10
VIII. U.S. Response
Generally, individuals and institutions overwhelmingly re-
sponded in favor of the Convention followihg its adoption in
1980.111 However, with the onset of Senate Hearings in April 1984,
dissenting views were also expressed." 12
A. The Convention's International Business Test
Criticism was directed against the way the Convention distin-
guishes international sales from other transactions." 3 The only re-
quirement for application of the Convention is that parties have their
places of business in different states." 4 Thus, according to the cri-
sonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in
reliance on the offer." Id.
108 Art. 29(1). "A contract may be modified or terminated by the mere agreement of
the parties." Id.
109 Respectively, U.C.C. § 2-205 (firm offers in writing by merchants) and U.C.C. § 2-
209 (a modification needs no consideration to be binding).
I I0 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co.,
322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). See also Lansing & Hauserman, A Comparison of the
Uniform Commercial Code to UNCITRAL's Convention on Contract for the International Sale of
Goods, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 63 (1980).
1 1 1 See, e.g., Vienna Convention for Sale of Goods gets Strong Backing at ABA Session,
19 Int'l Trade Rep., U.S. Export Weekly (BNA), No. 19, at 728 (Aug. 16, 1983); American
Bar Association Report to the House of Delegates, 18 INT'L LAW. 39 (1984). Also, foreign institu-
tions as Comecon, LAWASIA, The Asia-African Consultative Committee, and the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce spoke out in favor of adoption of the Convention. See Sono,
The Role of UNCITRAL, in INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 20, at §§ 4.01-.06.
112 See Rosett I, supra note 73, and Rosett, The International Sales Convention: A Dissenting
View, 18 INT'L LAW. 445 (1984) [hereinafter Rosett II]. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 6,
statement by Frank A. Orban, III at 36 [hereinafter Orban Statement], statement of Arthur
Rosett at 73 [hereinafter Rosett Statement], statement of Harold J. Berman at 79 [herein-
after Berman Statement]; Note, Unification and Certainty: The United N\ations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1984 (1984); Brooks, ll'hv Con-
gress Should Be flary of the U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods, Heritage Founda-
tion Backgrounder (No. 361) (June 15, 1984).
1 13 Rosett I, supra note 73, at 269 ("The very interconnectedness of domestic and in-
ternational economies that motivates the effort to harmonize contract law demonstrates
that the international transaction often is neither functionally nor definitionally distinct
from other sales."); Berman Statement, supra note 112; Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 80;
Brooks, supra note 112, at 3.
114 Art. 1(1). In the event of multiple places of business, the place "with the closest
relationship to the contract and its performance" counts, Art. 10(a). A temporary place
during negotiations does not qualify. Id. SeeJ. HONNOLD, supra note 1, at 44. See also Eoi:si,
General Provisions in INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 20, § 2.07 at 2-27.
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tique, a contract between two U.S. citizens, one of which is based
abroad, agreed to and performed wholly within the United States
would be subject to the Convention, and not, more appropriately,
the UCC."I 5 On the other hand, an agreement between an American
citizen and a foreigner (each having a business address in the United
States) falls outside the Convention, notwithstanding the fact that
the subject matter of the contract may travel around the world. 16
It was suggested to add international border crossing as a test
for international sales.' 17 The Convention, however, had rejected
this solution as impractical." 18 For example, at the time of sale a
seller may be uncertain whether border crossing will take place. He
may not then know whether to ship the goods from the United States
or a foreign country, or whether in an "f.o.b. United States city" con-
tract the buyer will take the goods abroad. In those cases, what hap-
pens after signing the contract determines the applicability of the
Convention. 1 9 Another proposal was to make the use of interna-
tional communications the criterion for international sales.' 20 This
test also has its problems as international agreements could be en-
tered into without using any international communications, or in
connection with local communications. The question then is which
communication, local or international, facilitated the contract. Fi-
nally, because of difficulties of separating international from national
sales, a third suggestion was to abolish plans for an international law
of sales altogether.' 2 '
Realizing that no solution would be perfect, the Convention
opted for a simple place of business test. Parties have complete free-
dom to opt out of the agreement. Thus the two U.S. citizens, one of
whom lives abroad, may see no problem in electing the UCC as the
governing law. Also, it is not unreasonable for a foreigner who
maintains a place of business in the United States to familiarize him-
self with U.S. law. To abolish an international law of sales com-
pletely requires buyers and sellers of different countries to study
each other's legal systems in many circumstances, the main feat the
Convention seeks to prevent.
B. The Convention's Compromises
A second attack is directed against the Convention's compromis-
115 See Berman Statement, supra note 112.
116 Id. at 80.
1 17 See Rosett I, supra note 73, at 275-79.
118 In addition to different places of business, the Convention's predecessor, the
Hague Conventions, required border crossing or international communications or deliv-
ery as a condition for application. Id. at 274.
1 19 SeeJ. HONNOLD, supra note 1, at 74.
120 Rosett 1, supra note 73, at 275-79.
121 Id. at 269.
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ing nature. 122 To promote acceptability, the Convention excludes
several currently controversial issues, such as product liability and
validity of contract. The scope of these exclusions is not always
clear. For instance, does the exclusion for personal injury include
claims for property losses? Do disclaimer clauses go to the validity of
the contract and thus must be judged by domestic law, or are they of
procedural nature and covered by the Convention? Conflict on these
issues already exists. 12 3 Another problem is that international law
continues to apply to questions not within the Convention's scope,
thus exacerbating the legal uncertainty which the Convention seeks
to resolve. 124 Recognizing the shortcomings, the drafters still pre-
ferred alimited Convention over no Convention.
Another attack on the compromising nature of the Convention
is more subtle. Although acknowledging the virtue of compromise,
the Convention is alleged to have ignored underlying differences, al-
lowing inconsistencies to remain if agreement was unattainable.' 2 5
By using vague or abstract language, it is said, the Convention
sweeps problems under the rug rather than solving them.126 Article
8 serves to illustrate. This Article deals with interpretation of state-
ments or other conduct by the parties and applies to prior, present,
and post-contract communications.' 27 At issue is whether such
statements should be received objectively or subjectively. While
122 Id. at 281-93; see also Note, supra note 112.
123 Compare Note, Disclaimers of Implied Warranties: The 1980 United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 863 (1985) (which argues
that the U.C.C.'s provisions on disclaimer of warranties should be regarded as test for
validity under the Convention) with J. HONNOLD, supra note 1, at 234 (who (hesitantly)
regards disclaimer clauses as interpretation, not "validity").
124 Berman Statement, supra note 112, at 80.
125 Note, supra note 112, at 1988-89.
The negotiators often declined to reconcile conflicts over fundamental prin-
ciples. Instead, they sought to compromise on linguistic formulations amena-
ble to all points of view-formulations that consequently lack any determinate
meaning. These compromises appeared in several forms: a principal rule
with exceptions, a rule accommodating many types of doctrines, or a rule
consisting of conflicting or at least unresolved subparts.
Id.
126 Rosett I, supra note 73, at 270-71.
127 Art. 8.
(1) For the purposes of this Convention, statements made by and other
conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the
other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understand-
ing that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have
had in the same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable
person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant cir-
cumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the
parties have- established between themselves, usages and any subsequent
conduct of the parties.
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many countries originally adhered to the subjective theory of con-
tract, most (including the United States) switched to an objective the-
ory subject to certain exemptions. In perpetuating the subjective
approach, article 8(1) holds that statements by a party are to be "in-
terpreted according to his intent whether the other party knew or
could not have been unaware what that intent was." In article 8(2)
the Convention follows the objective theory, which reads that "if Ar-
ticle 8(1) is inapplicable, statements made by a party are to be inter-
preted according to the understanding that a reasonable person
would have had." The objective path is also taken in article 8(3),
which provides that in determining intent of a party or the under-
standing of a reasonable person, "due consideration is to be given to
all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any
practices which the parties have established between themselves, us-
ages and any subsequent conduct of the parties." The problem then
is when to apply article 8(1) or article 8(2), and whether article 8(3)
may be used both to determine whether a party knew or could not
have been unaware what the other's intent was (article 8(1)), or is
limited to determining the reasonable person standard under article
8(2).128
The difference between subsection (1) and (2) seems to be that
in article 8(1) the listener understood or should have understood
what the speaker meant, and in article 8(2) the listener had a differ-
ent understanding. These are different situations, asking for a differ-
ent solution. Thus, where the listener was aware, it is not
unreasonable to allow the speaker's subjective intent to prevail.
Where, as under article 8(2) the speaker created the ambiguity, how-
ever, it is not unreasonable that objective intent prevails. Further,
when there is a question under article 8(1) as to whether the listener
should have known the speaker's intent, the reasonable person test is
applied to determine intent. It is the speaker who created the
doubt. 129
C. The Convention's Stultifying Nature
A further allegation is that the Convention freezes the law and
stills growth. The Convention, it is said, is built in stone. State and
federal governments are robbed from their powers to change the
Convention, while UNCITRAL, a body working by unanimous con-
sent, lacks the means and power to assume their role. Also, how can
contracting states provide uniform answers without even a monitor-
128 Rosett I, supra note 73, at 288.
12) Another inconsistency was said to be raised by the price term provisions (arts. 14
and 55) which have been discussed supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text; see Rosett I.
supra note 73, at 288-89, ("Compromises [were] reached by including two inconsistent
provisions: Articles 14 and 55, and open price terms.")
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ing body in place?130
Although further development of the Convention will not be
without problems,' 3' the future does not seem as bleak as pictured.
The Convention does not displace national law, but implements it in
the international sphere, an area of law generally out of reach of do-
mestic legislatures. Further, UNCITRAL does operate as a monitor-
ing body in international trade.' 32 Following a long and difficult
delivery, it is not to be expected that UNCITRAL will abandon its
baby. The Secretariat already has started to monitor the implemen-
tation of the Convention, and no doubt will find ways to collect and
disseminate interpretations elsewhere. Should states become totally
disgruntled with further developments, however, the Convention
permits a total denunciation by formal notice in writing to the U.N.
Secretary. ' 3 3
IX. The Convention's Future
Whatever the trials and tribulations during gestation, the world
generally has received the Convention favorably and is slowly under-
standing its meaning. With growing knowledge of the Convention,
its acceptance is becoming more widespread. In the next five years
thirty to forty countries are expected to ratify the Convention.
The recent U.S. Senate ratification has made the Convention a
fait accompli for American business and its legal presentation. Busi-
ness people must learn to take advantage of the Convention's provi-
sions, or to prevent surprises. An actual first task will be to "opt
out" of the Convention in those contracts which allow for a more
IS0 Rosett I, supra note 73, at 295-99.
131 Art. 7 alone, which requires interpretation in "good faith," in conformity with
"general principles," and by "the rules of private international law," opens up a true Pan-
dora's box.
132 See Training and Assistance of the Secretary General, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, Nineteenth Session, New York, 16 June - 1I July 1986, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/282 (1986):
By its resolution 40/71 of 11 December 1985 on the report of the Commis-
sion on the work of its eighteenth session, the General Assembly reaffirmed
the importance, in particular for developing countries, of the work of the
Commission concerned with training and assistance in the field of interna-
tional trade law. It also reaffirmed the desirability for the Commission to
sponsor symposia and seminars, in particular those organized on a regional
basis, to promote training and assistance in the field of international trade
law. The General Assembly also expressed its appreciation to those govern-
ments, regional organizations and institutions that had collaborated with the
Secretariat in organizing regional symposia and seminars, and invited Gov-
ernments, international organizations and institutions to assist the Secreta-
riat in financing and organizing symposia and seminars, in particular in
developing countries. The General Assembly also invited Governments, rel-
evant United Nations organs, organizations, institutions and individuals to
make voluntary contributions which might be utilized to enable nationals of
developing countries to participate in symposia and seminars.
Id.
133 Art. 101.
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favorable clause. 13 4 But should the Convention be the choice of law,
an "opt-in" clause may be necessary in situations where the place of
business test leaves doubt. A review of standard form contracts is
warranted in light of the Convention.
Companies with little clout may wish to take immediate advan-
tage of the Convention. By including the Convention in their negoti-
ations and agreements they will avoid having to argue against
foreign law. Companies with clout may want to test the Convention,
especially in American courts, as the courts will play a leading role in
clarifying the Convention.13 5 Therefore, a "choice of court" clause
should be included wherever possible. Additionally, parties should
include a choice of law clause for issues falling outside the
Convention. 136
Another task will be to keep a record of new adhering states. It
is not unlikely that as an outflow of the United States accession,
other states will follow in rapid succession. 137
Finally, Americans should remain involved in the ongoing dia-
logue on the Convention. Although the Convention's creation took
over fifty years, this was only the courtship period. To help the mar-
riage succeed and to enable the Convention to fulfill its purpose
(reaching agreement with foreign buyers and sellers on the applica-
ble law and decreasing legal costs in researching and proving foreign
law) increased worldwide participation and cooperation continues to
be important.
134 For suggested "opt-out" clauses see Question 4, Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 58.
By excluding the Convention in favor of state law, the Convention may still apply. Treaty
law may be considered part of state law.
135 "The delegates, by compromising on indeterminate rules, seem to have placed on
national courts the ultimate burden of defining standards of conduct." Note, supra note
112, at 1989.
136 Farnsworth has stated that in appropriate cases the Convention may be applied by
courts as well as arbitral tribunals (19 Int'l Trade Rep., U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 14,
at 527 (July 12, 1983)), thus suggesting a governing law clause also in arbitration clauses.
137 Business Law Inc., recently began a new looseleaf publication on the Convention.
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